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Denunciation, blame and the moral turn in public life
1. Introduction
Public life is increasingly dominated by accusations of wrongdoing by people in both 
their public and private capacities. This is a function, in part, of the affordances of 
social media, but it also reflects a broader moral turn in public discourse. Moral 
transgressions are increasingly expected to be called out, and perpetrators held 
morally accountable for said behavior in public fora, ranging from television 
broadcasts (e.g. Riggs and Due 2010), online discussion boards (e.g. Campbell and 
Manning 2014), through to Twitter and related social media (e.g. Zarkov and Davis 
2018), and increasingly, mixes of all of the above (e.g. Milbrandt 2017; Rintel, Angus 
and Fitzgerald 2016). The commonsense view of morality is that moral values are 
seen “as not only given, independent, and necessary (absolute) but as thinglike or as 
objects not subject to individual interpretation” (Douglas 1970: 120). However, the 
behaviours targeted in public denunciations do not necessarily represent moral 
transgressions in themselves, but rather are constructed as such through discourse 
(Bergmann 1998; Garfinkel 1964; Luckmann 1995). Indeed, it is widely 
acknowledged that although morality may well constitute “a reasonably coherent set 
of notions of what is right and what is wrong”, what counts as right or wrong is 
“intersubjectively constructed in communicative interaction”, and thus “selected, 
maintained and transmitted in complex social processes” (Luckmann 2002: 19). For 
this reason, what counts as (im)moral conduct is a site of ongoing discursive struggle. 
While such ongoing struggles are unlikely to end any time soon, if ever, what has 
arguably changed in recent years is the loosening of strictures on publicly denouncing 
immoral behavior (Tileagă 2010, 2012a; cf. Augoustinos and Every 2010), even when
the (alleged) moral transgressions happen within the remit of traditionally conceived 
intimate or private relationships. 
Intimate relationships, though essentially private, are increasingly publicly 
scrutinized as a result of the emergence of a democracy of emotions in everyday life 
(Giddens 1999), and the blurring of the private and public spheres. This is observed in
practices of intimate self-disclosures to intimate and non-intimate others in public 
spaces that thereby become interspersed with private moments. It is also observed in 
the way that the democratization of emotional communication has enabled the 
performance of the kind of mediated spectacle that brings everyday morality into 
public discussion (Dovey 2000). In these contexts, such as those that have received 
much attention in broadcast talk (e.g. Carbaugh 1988; Livingstone and Lunt 1994; 
Shattuc 1997), ordinary people disclose their intimate feelings and actions in public 
fora. Their revelations and especially the discussion of the moral value assigned to 
them has thus become a form entertainment. In so doing, ordinary people often 
become public figures by the notoriety they gain through such disclosures.
In this paper, we explore this moral turn in public life through the lens of 
public denunciations. A public denunciation is a type of “status degradation 
ceremony” where the expression of moral indignation against those who have 
contravened the moral expectations of a given community serves to effect the 
destruction of the person denounced (Garfinkel 1956: 421). Public degradation 
ceremonies are thus intimately related to the assigning of blame and to the alleged 
perpetrator’s concomitant denial of wrongdoing. Yet in spite of the evident 
importance of denunciations for “canonizing” moral expectations in public life 
(Luckmann 2002), Garfinkel’s (1956) work was primarily focused on how formal 
degradation in institutional communities, such as in courts of law or the army, leads to
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demotion or even exclusion. This thus leaves open the question of “what happens 
when you extend the notion of degradation ceremonies to the public sphere?” (Tileagă
2012b: 69), especially when the transgressor is not an official public figure and the 
denunciation is situated in “our ever-mutating experience of the private and public” 
(Dovey 2000:1).
Prior research on (moral) transgressions has to varying degrees touched on the 
notion of public denunciations to examine the behaviour of public figures, understood
here as public officials, or other individuals with some kind of institutionally-
conferred role involved in public affairs, whose actions are judged to contravene the 
social expectancies of their public roles in society. These typically include political 
figures or institutions (e.g. Ekström and Johansson 2008; Hansson 2018a), corporate 
leaders (e.g. Faulkner 2011), and celebrities (e.g. Bramall 2018), who become the 
objects of scandals (e.g. Adut 2008; Thompson 2000) or political condemnations (e.g. 
Kampf and Katriel 2017). Our project is different. It seeks to extend the inquiry into 
moral transgressions by examining how denunciations about an ostensibly non-public 
figure are interactionally accomplished in broadcast talk and, in this process, shine 
light on the way moral conduct is intersubjectively constructed. Drawing from a 
larger corpus of public denunciations in broadcast settings, we focus our discussion 
on a particular instance in which the target of public denunciation is degraded and 
reconstructed as amoral in the confounded private-public arena of a daytime TV panel
show.
The alleged transgressor of our study, Mitch Winehouse, is in the public eye. 
He is the father of Amy Winehouse, the musical icon who suffered a sudden death 
following a troubled life of substance abuse. However, Mitch Winehouse is arguably 
not a public figure. Although he has acquired some ‘celebrity’ status, his role in 
society is not accountable to taxpayers’ money or related to the general public 
interests of society. In view of this, the situatedness of the denunciation examined in 
this paper is also different. Mitch, the alleged transgressor, endorses the confirmation 
of the expected values associated with his role as a father, but reflexively resists its 
critique by invoking justifications based on his information preserves (Goffman 1969)
as a close father to his daughter. The set of facts about himself and about his 
daughter’s circumstances that he invokes belong to the private rather than public 
sphere. They are thus difficult to contest despite the blurred distinction between the 
public and private (e.g. Shattuc 1997) of the daytime television show in which he is 
publicly denounced.
Our analysis focuses on how this public denunciation of Mitch develops in the
course of this panel interview. In so doing we shine light on the way in which blaming
perpetrators lies at the core of public denunciations. We show how public 
denunciations contribute to reaffirming moral common ground, are themselves 
immanent to the moral infrastructure of public life, and how the contemporary 
blurring of the private and public spheres (Habermas 1989) provides fertile though 
contested grounds for the interactive construction of morality. In order to 
contextualize our analytical claims, we first briefly discuss prior research on blaming 
and public denunciation, before going on to describe the data and methodological 
approach that underpins our analysis.
2. Blame and public denunciation
Various forms of moral criticisms, including accusing, blaming, complaining, 
criticising, condemning, denouncing, reproaching, reprimanding, and associated 
expressions of moral indignation or outrage, have been examined in a diverse range of
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discourse settings from a variety of different disciplinary perspectives (Wodak 2006). 
Many studies have focused on what these various different types of moral criticism 
accomplish, and how targets and/or other recipients respond to them. It has been 
argued, for instance, that moral criticisms are a key means by which members 
(re)affirm “common moral ground” in both private and public life (Günther 1995:171;
cf. Kampf and Katriel 2017: 315). The targets of such moral criticisms may respond 
through various types of “justification discourses” (Wodak 2006), including accounts 
(e.g. Buttny 1993), other avoidance strategies (e.g. Hansson 2015, 2018), apologies or
other forms of remedial exchange (e.g. Kampf and Löwenheim 2012; Tileagă 2012b), 
or they may be outright reject or deny them (e.g. Coulter 1990). Non-target recipients,
on the other hand, may respond, for instance, by agreeing or disagreeing with the 
producers’ expression of moral indignation (e.g. Drew 1998). Studies of moral 
criticisms have also examined different types of targets, ranging from political figures 
(e.g. Dickerson 1998), government officials (e.g. Hansson 2018b), and corporations 
(e.g. Zhang and Vásquez 2014), to celebrities (e.g. Bramall 2018) and reality 
television participants (e.g. Author 2018b), through to intimates (e.g. Coulter 1990; 
Pomerantz 1978). Research addressing moral criticism has thus paid attention to the 
role played by different modalities and settings in shaping them, ranging from 
political statements (e.g. Hansson 2018a), war crime exhibitions (e.g. Martin and 
Wodak 2003) and criminal proceedings in courtrooms (e.g. Atkinson and Drew 1979),
to different forms of social media (e.g. Milbrandt 2017), through to counselling or 
psychotherapy sessions (e.g. Buttny 1990; Kurri and Wahlström 2005), and spoken 
interaction in more mundane, everyday settings (e.g. Günthner 1995). 
Public degradation ceremonies are a specific form of moral criticism that aims 
to instill a sense of remorse on the part of the transgressor and, given its public 
dimension, to mobilize support for the negative evaluation of the perpetrators’ 
conduct by the audience. They have been studied from a variety of perspectives, 
including forms of political condemnation (e.g. Kampf and Katriel 2017) and scandals
(e.g. Audt 2008; Ekström and Johansson 2008). However, a public denunciation 
(Garfinkel 1956) goes further in that its aim is not reintegrative but rather stigmatizing
(Braithwaite 1989), as it “undermine[s] the very legitimacy of the condemned party as
a social actor” (Kampf and Katriel 2017: 314) insofar as his or her actions are 
perceived to have breached (presumed) moral common ground. In publicly 
denouncing a perpetrator and reconstructing the events that led to the transgression, 
the parties (i.e. the denouncers and the alleged perpetrator) reveal differentiated levels
of reflexivity. They make implicit or explicit reference to the normative values of the 
community by which the alleged wrongdoer’s actions are judged. Public 
denunciations thus involve a double metapragmatic articulation (Botlanski 2011). On 
the one hand, they serve to confirm the expected normative behaviour or values 
associated with an individual’s actions in a given community, thus helping to re-
establish a “common moral ground” (see Günther 1995:171). On the other hand, 
public denunciations serve to critique deviance from normative values in light of the 
tensions that the alleged moral transgression brought about in the public realm. Public
denunciations thus constitute an illustration of how morality is interactively 
constructed and different moral worlds are invoked in the process, especially in 
communicative arenas where the public and the private spheres are mixed. 
Notably, although Garfinkel (1956) outlined the proposed conditions for the 
‘success’ of public denunciations, they have been less frequently studied from a 
discursive perspective that one might expect. Studies that examine how targets are 
publicly denounced in actual discursive events have focused primarily on how blame 
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is ascribed to third parties (e.g. Abell and Stokoe 1999), the self-degradation 
ceremonies accomplished through public apologies in response to such denunciations 
(Tileagă 2012b), or in noting that political condemnations may morph into public 
degradation ceremonies when the condemnation backfires (Kampf and Katriel 2017: 
314). More recently, the rise of “online civic shaming” (Milbrandt 2017) or other 
forms of “digilantism” (Zingerle 2015) have garnered attention, although frequently 
from the perspective of treating it as a form of cyberbulling (Hollis 2016).
Blaming, in contrast, has been examined in both institutional environments, 
such as administrative government settings (Hansson 2015, 2018b), courtrooms 
(Lowrey and Ray 2015), and schools (Goodwin 1996), as well as in non-institutional, 
private settings. Studies of blamings in institutional settings have generally examined 
the conditions necessary for blame attribution. Hansson (2015), for example, 
examines attributions of blame and their respective reactions from a discourse-
historical perspective that primarily draws on critical discourse analysis (e.g. Wodak 
2006), with a view to establishing a framework for the analysis of blame attribution in
government discourse. Studies of blamings in non-institutional settings have, in 
contrast, tended to focus on the sequential organization of blamings and their 
avoidance, including studies by conversation analysts (e.g. Beach 1990/1991; 
Mandelbaum 1993; Pomerantz 1978), and discursive psychologists (e.g. Bloomberg 
2016; Sneijder and Te Molder 2005; Tileagă 2005). While public denunciation has 
only been addressed in passing in such studies, a number of important findings have 
arguably emerged from the broader discourse analytic literature on blamings.
First, it is evident that second-person blaming is a sensitive or delicate social 
action (Mandelbaum 1993, Author 2018a). Pomerantz (1978), for instance, suggests 
that “sequences may be organised to permit and prefer attributing blame to self (e.g. 
apologies, admissions, confessions) over attributing blame to co-participant (e.g. 
blamings, complaints, accusations)” (p.120). This is primarily because blamings, and 
associated reproaches, encompass “morally sensitive” and “affectively loaded” moral 
judgments of the target in question (Günthner 1995: 147, 169). Second, the party 
initiating the blaming or reproach can themselves be held responsible for making that 
moral judgment, and thus to counter-accusations or reproaches (Author 2015). Third, 
they demand a morally loaded response, which is frequently held to be some kind of 
admission, account or apology in the case of blame directed at co-present recipients 
(Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe 2014: 172). However, in reality, they are often met 
with denials or counter-attacks, thereby seeding (interpersonal) conflict (Coulter 
1990). In other words, the morality of the blaming or reproach itself can become the 
object of discursive dispute. 
It follows, then, that public denunciations are likely to be accomplished in 
ways that “warrant the speaker’s sense of moral offense and indignation” (Drew 1998:
297), thereby conferring the moral imperative for that public denunciation. The case 
we address in this paper illustrates how the non-observance of latent moral values 
give others within the respective society the right to publicly denounce perpetrators in
order to re-vindicate the moral order, that is, the “seen but unnoticed” expectations 
(Garfinkel 1964: 226) that are immanent to everyday conduct. 
3. Data and method
In this paper we focus on a segment from an episode of a British daytime television 
show in which the guest is publicly denounced by the panelists as contributing to his 
own daughter’s demise: from global music acclaim to personal turmoil due to 
substance excess, and subsequent premature death due to alcohol poisoning. The 
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segment forms part of a larger corpus of fifteen interviews collected from broadcast 
settings in which the interviewee is given the opportunity to explain “their side of the 
story” in relation to behavior on their part that has led to them being publicly 
maligned.1 However, close examination of these interviews suggests while such 
interviews are ostensibly an opportunity for the audience to hear “both sides of the 
story”, they very often serve primarily as a vehicle for publicly denouncing the 
interviewee. 
The specific excerpt we analyse here comes from ITV’s Loose Women, a 
popular British panel TV show, where Mitch Winehouse, father of the famous musical
artist Amy Winehouse, has been invited to talk about his daughter’s life. Mitch 
Winehouse has been depicted in the press as both, a protective father and an 
opportunist, especially with respect to his daughter. He has claimed that the 
documentary film has deliberately portrayed him in the worst possible light (The 
Guardian, 1 May 2015). As shown in the advertisement of the show below, Mitch was
invited as a guest to talk about the release of the pre-trailer of the 2015 British 
documentary film ‘Amy: The girl behind the name’ directed by Asif Kapadia, his 
family and his daughter’s legacy. 
“As father to one of the most talented artists in British music history, Mitch 
Winehouse was a regular face in the press during Amy’s rise and fall. After her tragic 
death in July 2011, aged just 27, he established the Amy Winehouse Foundation in 
order help young people in need, just like Amy. Mitch has been back in the papers in 
recent weeks, expressing his unhappiness with the new documentary that’s been made
about the singer, called, simply ‘Amy’. He join us this lunchtime to talk about the 
film, family and Amy’s legacy.” ITV website (retrieved on 25/09/2016)
Instead, the panelists, especially one of them, take him to task for being an enabler of 
his daughter’s demise and eventual death.
The format of this show involves well-known women sitting on a panel in 
front of a studio audience to discuss topics that usually revolve around recent events 
and interview guests. The panelists and the guest sit around a desk with coffee mugs 
in front of them. They face each other and are in full view of the audience. The topics 
they talk about range from light-hearted to serious, depending on the nature of the 
events discussed. The show is presented as an informal televised occasion to air 
intimate socio-psychological issues. In keeping with the genre of reality TV shows 
(Creeber 2015) the participants perform a mediated ethical self (Moseley, Wheatley 
and Wood 2013) in as much as they fashion themselves and their lives on camera in 
terms of right or wrong conduct. In other words, their occupational role is to discuss 
and denounce behaviour that is in line or contravenes what they, with the help of the 
audience, understand to be the supra-values of the larger society they represent. The 
panelists are thus invested with the authority to speak about these values, particularly 
when they feel they have not been duly observed (Garfinkel 1956: 423).
The sustaining of moral sensibilities is part and parcel of the success of this 
type of televised programme. Some of the topics discussed are indicative of what 
Salman Rushdie (2001) has called the ‘death of morality’, characteristic of 
postmodern societies. They capitalize on the alleged ‘inverted ethical universe’ 
(Rushdie 2001) of the guests in order to broaden its appeal. Mitch Winehouse 
represents an ideal guest. He has been negatively criticized in the press for some of 
1 The corpus consists of recordings and transcripts of interviews collected from the Australian, British,
New Zealand, and U.S. media between 2006-2018.
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his actions towards his daughter vis à vis his claim that the film has depicted him as a 
villain.
The analysis of this excerpt from our corpus is approached from an 
interactional discursive perspective informed by research in sociopragmatics and 
ethnomethodological conversation analysis. The analysis pays attention to the way in 
which the blame is constructed and resisted by the interactional participants, and how 
the pursuit of this blaming frames the interview as a public denunciation of Mitch. 
This is done by drawing on Goffman’s (1967) notion of face, elements from CA to 
capture how the participants attempt to assign blame and deny it in the turn-by-turn 
sequential development of that interaction (Heritage 1984), as well as elements from 
membership categorisation analysis (Sacks 1992) that offer insights into the broader 
indexical value of those blamings given they stem from what a good parent should do 
for their children. In other words, while our analysis is firmly grounded in a sequential
analysis of segments from broadcast talk, it also considers the way in which this 
segment forms part of a much larger, morally-imbued discourse universe.
4. The role of blaming in public denunciations
Moralizing judgments, such as those observed in this episode, involve an evaluation 
of some conduct as infringing expectations, in this case an infringement of supra-
community values. They entail moral criticisms on the basis of a normative 
assessment of (an aspect of) his or her conduct. When the negative assessment carries 
with it the implication that the individual is responsible for his or her action blaming 
occurs (Malle, Gugliemo and Monroe 2014; Smart 1961; Watson 1978). Zimmerman 
(1998) explains that when we blame someone we judge his or her moral standing to 
have diminished. And, when such as assessment is constructed as part of a routinely 
uniform behaviour (Garfinkel 1956), the true character of the perpetrator is revealed.
Blame is thus a negative evaluative judgment made of a person in light of their
actions or attitudes relative to the broader relational contexts in which that person is 
being evaluated. Blame carries the implication of responsibility. It therefore has clear 
implications for loss of face in that interactional moment as well as having potential 
long-standing negative identity implications (Garfinkel 1956). In that sense, blaming 
can be a vehicle for causing offence and seeding conflict insofar as it is harms the 
public image or face of the person portrayed as perpetrator (Goffman 1967). However,
for blame to be effected its bases need to be established. This, we argue, is what one 
of the panelists attempts to achieve by invoking aspects of the moral order that were 
infringed by Mitch Winehouse in pursuit of his self-interests to the detriment of the 
shared norms and values that ought to bind individuals together. After a few fits and 
starts to make Mitch (partially) responsible for Amy’s fate on the basis of some of his 
actions, one of the panelists manages to attribute responsibility to him for the non-
observance of norms that are culturally available to him as a member of an 
Anglophone culture, freedom from imposition (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987), by 
drawing on the inferentially-rich category-bound obligations (Fitzgerald 2012) of 
parents with regard to their children (Fitzgerald and Austin 2008; Stokoe and Edwards
2014).
What the analysis shows is not so much Mitch talking about Amy’s legacy as 
advertised, but an attempt but the panelists, especially by Jane Moore, to implicate 
Mitch in Amy’s demise, thus amounting to a public denunciation of Mitch. This is in 
keeping with the views of the general public that paint a picture of Mitch Winehouse 
as a father primarily interested in profiting from his daughter, and with the role of the 
panelists to speak of and invoke the values that are internalized by members of a 
6
given culture and bind them together. In view of this, the moralizing judgments and 
public denunciations observed in the interaction below are to be expected and can be 
claimed to be institutionally sanctioned (Culpeper 2011). They are in line with the 
occupational roles of the panelists and a constitutive ingredient of the genre. Through 
these Jane attempts to assign responsibility to Mitch as an enabler in his daughter’s 
self-destruction, that is, as accountable for Amy’s fate (Buttny 1993).
While the interview turns out to be a vehicle for public denunciation, the 
interactional segment actually starts with Mitch Winehouse offering an extended 
assessment of the way he believes he has been misrepresented in the film as a result of
its editing (data not shown), and thus an attempt to forestall (anticipated) accusations 
of wrongdoing with respect to Amy’s needs vis à vis his moral duty as her father. 
Mitch’s agenda in appearing on the program appears to be to restore his moral 
reputation in light of the release of the film that implicates him in Amy’s downfall . 
However, the line of questioning from Jane Moore, and subsequently Andrea 
McLean, indicates their agenda is blaming Mitch for his role, in part at least, in 
enabling Amy’s downfall, a vehicle through which they attempt to prosecute ritual 
destruction of his moral reputation.
The excerpt from the interview with Mitch on which we are focusing our 
analysis here begins with Jane positioning herself as a “viewer” who is entitled to her 
own opinion (line 18), and the grounding of her evaluation in the knowledge she 
gained in that capacity, that is, the knowledge anyone who watches the documentary 
would be able to gain. (J = Jane Moore; M = Mitch Winehouse; A = Andrea 
McLean).2
“No Regrets As A Father To Amy” Loose Women, ITV, 3 July 2015
17  J:I-I have seen the film (.) 
18 so let me just um um say this (.)
19 there’s not a narrator is there,
20  M: no.
21  J: it’s kind of everybody’s sort of 
22 viewpoint uh °that were around Amy°
23 (.) now
24  M: no. [no]
25  J:     [I ] actually
26  M: there isn’t anybody in there that 
27 was around Amy (.) that’s the point
28  J: no. no. but what what you do as a: (.)
29 a viewer is you that make up your own
30 min[d
31  M:    [ye[p
32  J:       [nobody is sort of saying to you-
33 there’s not a narrator sort of pushing
34 you in a certain direc[tor-  ] direction.
35  M:                       [no no.]
36  J: so: (.) what I what it came away for
Given Mitch has already alluded to the film being biased in its (mis)representation of 
his role in Amy’s downfall (data not shown), Jane appears to be working through the 
course of this sequence to forestall “the risk of being treated as a biased party 
predictably blaming the other” (Abell and Stokoe 1999: 299). In other words, in 
2 The interview, which was transcribed using CA transcription conventions, is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2JDapMUNmc4. A copy of the complete transcription of the 
interview is available from the authors on request.
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proposing an alternative description of the film as not having a (potentially biased) 
line (line 19), Jane is alluding to the “dilemma of stake and interest” (Edwards and 
Potter 1992: 158) that descriptions of “reality” frequently entail. Notably, she 
introduces this description through a tag question (line 19) designed to mobilise 
agreement from Mitch. In so doing, Jane invites conversational alignment with a new 
course of action: to establish the facts from which she, and the audience, should be 
able to hold him accountable for (some of) his action (lines 21-23). This allows her to 
pursue her interactional agenda in the interest of the audience and the general public, 
as well as to demonstrate sensitivity to the moral delicacy of her incipient activity 
(Mandelbaum 1993).
Mitch offers an explicit disagreement at line 24 forestalling the initiation of 
Jane’s next action (indexed through ‘now’ at line 23). He goes on to imply that Amy’s 
life in the documentary was also potentially misrepresented through an alternative 
description (Beach 1990/91). Notably, he places prosodic emphasis on ‘anybody’ in a 
way that makes relevant his knowledge as a father who was close to his daughter in an
attempt to disarm (Edmondson 1981) any kind of argument Jane could possibly come 
up with in this respect (lines 26-27). That is, the information preserves justifications 
he has offered (prior to this excerpt), based on his close father-daughter relationship, 
would thus make negative judgments implying his responsibility unsustainable. He 
reiterates, albeit indirectly, his point about being misrepresented by offering a 
metapragmatic comment to account for his repair (‘that’s the point’ line 27). In so 
doing, he orients to Jane’s prior claims as launching an incipient or pre-blaming 
sequence. 
Jane thus goes back to the point in the interaction where stance alignment was 
previously achieved in lines 19-20 and repositions herself as viewer in pursuit of her 
goal (lines 32-34). This positions Mitch to re-align with her project. This is observed 
in the micropause subsequent to the production of ‘so’ (line 36) where Mitch could 
have come in, but did not given that these facts had already been agreed. With ‘so’ 
Jane marks a connection with what has been established thus far and indicates the 
ensuing initiation of the pending activity (Bolden 2009).
Jane then proceeds to offer the grounds on which to implicate blame and 
warrant her denunciation of Mitch, as we can see in the continuation of the interview 
below. 
36  J: so: (.) what I- what it came away for
37 me is that actually you Amy were
38 very close 
39 (.)
40  M: mhm.
41  J: she adored you you adored her (.) 
42 absolutely and I think as parents with
43 hindsight there are lots of things we
44 could say we would have done differently
45 with our children et cetera (.) the
46 only point I really lost sympathy for 
47 you was when (.) she went to Saint Lucia,
48  M: glad you brought that up
49  J: and she’d gone there to escape (.)
50  M: ye’
51  J: the madness=
52  M: =yeah
53  J: and you turned up with a camera crew.
54  M: a reality TV crew.
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55  J: a reality TV crew=
56  M: =aha=
57  J: =an’. as I felt looking at it(.) you
58 invaded her privacy again 
59 when she had gone there to get away
60 from that kind of thing.
61  M: we:ll the thing is (.) I was in Saint
62 Lucia every two weeks (0.3) because 
63 I would go and see Amy- she wanted me 
64 to be there every two weeks (.) I made-
65 that was not a reality TV crew, I made-
66 >I don’t know if some of you might have
67 seen it<, do you ever see (.) the- the
68 channel four documentary I made about 
69 the struggles of families (with) facing
70 with addictions? (0.1) you did? 
71 THAT (.) is what they are talking about 
72 (.) THAT is what they are saying is as a 
73 reality TV crew, they knew I took a 
74 TV cre[w]
She first acknowledges the possibility that he has knowledge about Amy that is not 
accessible to anyone else in his capacity as a father and that what she is about to say is
her own view. This is observed in the careful design of her next turn (lines 36-38, that 
is, the self-correction, the portrayal of her stance as subjective (“came away for me”), 
and the insertion of “actually” which frames her view as not necessarily in line with 
what she thinks Mitch might be expecting her to say (Clift 2001). This orients to both 
the preceding trouble as well as to that which her ensuing action is likely to create. In 
presenting her stance as personal, Jane presents it as subjective, hence open to contest.
Jane prefaces her responsibility-implicative negative judgement of Mitch’s actions 
with fabricated alignment (Goffman 1981), that is, a pretence of agreement, to 
advance her agenda, that is, she manages the activity so that Mitch and possibly others
will be induced to have a false belief about her ensuing action. She thus positions 
herself as a parent too and brings up the close bond between father and daughter (lines
37-38) to which Mitch reacts with an acknowledgment (line 40). This is followed by a
positive assessment of the strength of their bond (line 41). This time she positions 
both Mitch and herself as parents. Jane’s comment regarding parents’ negative ledger 
for non-deliberate wrongdoing also applies to Mitch through the use of the inclusive 
plural “as parents” (line 42) rather than “as a parent”, and “we” (line 43). The 
invocation of the category of (good) parents enables Jane to thereby invoke an 
inferentially rich set of category-bound obligations that lays further groundwork for 
the forthcoming blaming (Watson 1978). This is difficult for Mitch to counter given 
its commonsense nature as captured by the idiomaticity with which it is packaged. 
Having provided legitimate grounds for the implication of blame on what may be 
considered to be a general truth about most parents, and her own stance on the 
subject, she now initiates her moral criticism of Mitch.
Jane reporting that she “lost sympathy” for Mitch in lines 45-47 marks the 
point in the interaction where Jane moves into the denunciation sequence itself. That 
she has no sympathy for him despite his continued troubles in relation to his 
daughter’s addiction implies that he was at least partially responsible for Amy’s 
demise, hence for the sadness that befell him. Mitch’s reaction (line 48) displays that 
he has heard Jane’s contribution as implicative of forthcoming blame. It indicates he 
has no option but to discuss the topic as the factual information that Jane goes on to 
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provide (i.e. Mitch visiting his daughter while she was in St Lucia and filming her) 
could not, at least at this stage, be disputed. It also displays his understanding of the 
metapragmatic relevance of what is coming next and his awareness of the position the
panelists have taken: attributing to him moral responsibility for Amy’s fate on the 
basis of his actions.
Jane builds up her responsibility-implicative denunciation of Mitch across a 
number of turns. She cites the facts that led Amy to go St Lucia (lines 49 and 51) as 
antecedent to her responsibility-implicative moral judgement (line 53). This 
denunciation is accomplished through drawing attention to a discrepancy between 
what a good parent does and Mitch’s actions. The incongruousness of filming 
someone who needed to leave the general un-healthiness brought about by (unwanted)
celebrity attention implies that Mitch put his own goals before the needs of his 
daughter. This diminishes Mitch’s moral standing as a father who has “fail[ed] to act 
as a proper, responsible member of that category” (Stokoe and Edwards 2012: 187). 
She thus depicts his action as having violated a basic norm of that type of 
relationship: the obligation of parents to respect their children’s autonomy and ensure 
their well-being (Fitzgerald and Austin 2008). Put differently, theirs was not a 
relationship of equals where what is best for each other is pursued (Giddens 1999). 
Amy is depicted as constrained by the arbitrary power of her father. She is thus unable
to assert her agency under such circumstances. It then follows that she was not 
responsible for the state of affairs given her limited capacity to influence them 
(Laidlaw 2010). Instead, her father was.
Mitch reacts by initiating an alternative account of those events to undermine 
the grounds for Jane’s prior denunciation (Buttny 1990, 1993; Mandelbaum 1993), 
thereby resisting the implication that he is a “bad father”, and avoiding admission of 
fault (Pomerantz 1978). In other words, his subsequent account indicates that he has 
heard Jane’s contribution as blame-implicative. His alternative description begins with
a repair delivered through a modified repeat that amounts to a claim of greater 
epistemic authority with respect to those events (Stivers 2005). It also attends to the 
inferences made available by describing the group he brought to film as “a camera 
crew” as opposed to “a reality TV crew”, given the latter invokes the possibility that 
Mitch’s actions were exploitative rather than understanding of Amy’s situation. 
Jane treats this repair as non-consequential by readily accepting it through a 
repeat (line 55), before going on to reiterate the moral grounds for her denunciation of
Mitch (lines 57-60): that his behaviour is irreconcilable with a supra-value of the 
community the panelists represent, the alleged British middle-class (cf. working class)
supremacy of the individual’s freedom of action above all (Brown and Levinson 
1987), and the category-bound obligations of (good) parents to protect their children 
from exploitation or harm, and the importance of understanding their point of view as 
essential (Giddens 1999). The insertion of the adverb ‘again’ (line 59) implies that this
is not first time Mitch has done this. Jane thus does not call attention to a single 
offence but to a potential series of offences to demonstrate a pattern of moral 
irresponsibility. In so doing, Jane indicates that she is blaming him for contributing to 
the “madness” in Amy’s life (see lines 49, 51, 53). 
Mitch’s subsequent account  in lines 61-74 (which was itself initiated in line 
54) signals his understanding of the implicit metapragmatic activity that is taking 
place, that is, implicating him as (partly) responsible for Amy’s demise by construing 
him as a “bad” father who exploited his daughter’s difficulties (Buttny 1990). He first 
attends in his account to rebutting the accusation that he did not respect his daughter’s
need for privacy. He justifies his presence in St Lucia by juxtaposing her need to 
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escape the public’s attention with her desire to have her dad there on a regular basis 
(lines 61-64). In so doing, Mitch mobilizes his identity as a present father to Amy by 
providing more knowledge based on his information preserves (Goffman 1981) to 
counterbalance the grounds of the denunciation. Having rebutted the invasion of 
privacy for which he was blamed, he now addresses the allegedly unethical practice of
taking a film crew. He does this by recruiting the audience (lines 64-74) with a view 
to explaining his altruistic intentions behind it. He thus refers back to a film he had 
previously produced on the subject of addiction to reinstate his moral standing. The 
film is described as serious and morally laudable. This is illustrated in its institutional 
packaging (“Channel 4”), its instructive or educational purpose (“documentary”) and 
the social significance of its theme (“the struggles of families facing addictions”) 
(lines 68-70).
The justification offered does not necessarily diminish blame insofar as it 
could still be argued that he was partially responsible for Amy’s troubles. It does, 
however, delay consideration, albeit briefly, of the topic at hand, namely, the view of 
the panelists while Mitch had been authorized to film Amy, he should not have done 
so, as filming under such circumstances represents an infringement of the latent 
values of the culture he is part of, and what a good democratic relationship entails. As 
we can see in the continuation of the interview below, this is something Jane alludes 
to in her subsequent response to Mitch’s account (beginning in line 75).
74 TV cre[w]
75  J:       [b]ut whatever
76  M: no no
77  J: it’s for it’s a TV crew. (.) it’s a 
78 TV crew.
79  M: but it’s not a reality TV cr[ew,]
80  J:                             [no ] well
81 but that- [that is sort of not the]=
82  M:           [I-  I  went  out  there]
83  J: =point is it?
84  M: let me finish what I’m saying (.) I 
85 went out there and I took a serious 
86 fi-film crew 
87 (.)
88  J: aha
89  M: it was a serious documentary about 
90 addiction within the family (.) 
91 because of that film we have managed
92 to help hundreds of families, (.) 
93 >and we went there with Amy’s permission<
94 I can assure [you.]
95  J:              [yeah] but it’s 
96 st[ill]
96  M:   [of ]course when you
97  see that film [you ]
98  J:               [when] I see that I
99 think if it was my daughter (.) and
100 again um you know hindsight productions
101 [but ] if it were my daughter
102 M: [yep.]
103 J: I wouldn’t put her in the position (.)
104 of a:sking her whether or not I [could]
105 M:                                 [well ] 
106 J: bring a film [crew because I  would look ]=
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107 M:              [you- you you might be right]
108 J: =at it and say=
109 M: =°yeah°=
110 J: she shouldn’t- nobody should be 
111 there filming her at that point
112 [because  she  looked]
112 M: [well you might be ri]ght b[ut
113 J:                            [she
114 looked (.) natural (.) and happy 
115 [and ] great and relaxed,
116 M: [yeah]
117 J: [which  in  the  rest of  the  film- ]
118 M: [an’ why do you think she was (happy)]
119 natural and relaxed, cos she had her
120 family and friends ↑around her
121 J: [↑yeah]
122 M: [that’]s why=
123 J: =not a TV crew
124 M: no.
Jane’s dismisses the relevance of Mitch’s focus on the (alleged) misrepresentation of 
the camera crew as a “reality TV crew” (line 75). Her subsequent repair of Mitch’s 
turn (lines 77-78) and explicit metapragmatic comment that follows (“that is sort of 
not the point, is it” lines 81, 83) further undermines the relevance of this alternative 
description of events to exonerating him from blame.
At this juncture, Mitch construes Jane’s talk here as doing interruption (Bilmes
1997) in order to re-take speakership, before embarking on a justification of taking a 
film crew. He offers counter-assertions (Beach 1990/91) that undermine the 
denunciations (his film was for families suffering from addiction) as a form of 
“consciousness raising” (lines 89-92). He also defends himself against the accusation 
of having invaded her privacy by deflecting moral judgements onto something else: 
the altruistic benefits that can be accrued from something that some may see as 
offensive despite it having been condoned by its alleged victim (having been given 
permission by Amy - lines 93-94 - and Amy’s desire for him to be there - lines 63-64).
Jane, however, initiates a second denunciation sequence through invoking her 
identity as (good) mother who would not have asked her daughter to give permission 
for filming in the first place (lines 98-106). Unlike Mitch, Jane would have 
understood her daughter’s point of view and what was best for her and for one another
to have a good democratic relationship. She then claims that this is because “no one” 
should have been filming her “at that point” when she was happy having escaped 
unwanted media attention (lines 106, 110-112, 114-115). In so doing, Jane alludes to 
Amy’s inability to voluntarily assert agency under such conditions (Laidlaw 2010), 
and thus Mitch’s responsibility as a (good) father to have done so on her behalf (i.e. 
look after his daughter’s best interests and respecting her needs). She thus implies that
Amy had agreed to being filmed because she could not say no to her dad given the 
power he had over her. She makes available the inference that their closeness was not 
necessarily healthy, and so he should have known that it was not morally right to ask 
her to do so, as this would contravene the democratic basis of the relationship parents 
and their children ought to have. While Mitch initially offers concessive admissions 
(lines 107, 112), he then offers an alternative description of events (lines 118-120), 
and their conversation reaches an impasse as they appear to be agreeing on what are 
actually contradictory agendas (lines 121-124).
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Another panelist, Andrea McLean, intervenes at this point in the interview, as 
seen below.
125 A: ↑Mitch (.) can we- obviously we-we are 
126 all parents here, and ( ) as we said 
127 at the start at the end of day you 
128 are a dad that has lost a daughter=
129 M: =yeah.
130 A: erm is there anything- we (.) as
131 parents we all do our very best
132 for our children you under
133 particularly differ- difficult
134 circumstances- do you think there 
135 are some things that maybe with 
136 hindsight, as Jane mentioned, you’d 
137 look back and think. d- do you know
138 (.) maybe I got that bit wrong
139 M: ↓nu:h.
While Andrea also implicates that Mitch is partially to blame for Amy’s downfall, she 
orients to this denunciation as sensitive (Mandelbaum 1993) through various features 
of dispreferred turn design, including delaying the question her turn is leading up to 
very end of the turn (lines 134-139), the occurrence of (self-initiated) self repair (lines
125, 133) numerous cut-offs, restarts and hesitations (lines 125, 130, 134, 137), as 
well as mitigation (line 135, 138). That Andrea’s turn is seeking an admission of 
wrongdoing from Mitch is evident from the candidate answer (Pomerantz 1988) 
implicit in Andrea’s question that helps to present what she suspects is the answer and
expects confirmation of it, namely, that Mitch did get it (a bit) wrong. Mitch responds,
however, with denial that is delivered as the preferred response, thus construing 
Andrea’s turn as accusation-implicative (Garcia 1991). The overall agenda here of the 
panelists thus becomes abundantly clear: they are seeking to publicly denounce Mitch 
and seek an admission from him of his wrongdoing. Such an admission, however, is 
not forthcoming.
Overall, then, we have seen in this interview the alleged perpetrator and the 
denouncer seek conversational alignment to advance their conflicting agendas through
the production of increments and question tags at strategic interactional moments to 
induce agreement. Once this is achieved the participants build up the grounds for their
respective cases. We have seen how the denouncer builds on previously agreed 
information in the light of blame deflections by the perpetrator to recover the point of 
alignment and restart the blaming. The nature of the accounts the former provides 
challenge the denunciations made against him preventing him from engaging in what 
otherwise might become hostile disagreements. Their production is evidence of the 
fact that the guest has been put in a defensive position. We have observed how the 
panelist built up the grounds for blaming the guest, and how this, in turn, allowed the 
latter to deflect blame before it was eventually assigned. Both the evidence put 
forward and the grounds against it were constructed from a moral plane.
5. Public denunciation and the moral infrastructure of public life
The foregoing analysis offers us an example of blaming as a member’s method for 
13
moralizing whereby common moral ground is co-constructed and reaffirmed 
(Gunthner 1995: 171). It depicts a type of oppositional talk in which one of the 
panelists attempts to extract some sort of a confession or a display of remorse from a 
guest who is being publicly degraded on the basis of moral wrongdoing. The alleged 
perpetrator, Mitch Winehouse, seeks to attract and mobilize the support of third 
parties by falsifying the offences that have been attributed to him, as it is only when 
moral agency can be attributed to the perpetrator that blaming can be successfully 
performed, especially by those not directly involved (Malle, Gugliemo and Monroe 
2014: 171). It also shows how the denouncer, Jane Moore, relies on third parties 
publicly denounce Mitch and, at the same time, how Mitch attempts to rally support 
from the audience to repair damage to his moral self and deny responsibility. It thus 
constitutes a method for sustaining the moral infrastructure of the community the 
panelists take themselves to be representing.
The panelists thus express disapproval of Mitch in terms of his perceived 
rights as a father who has violated the normative ideals of a father-daughter 
relationship (Bennett 2013) contributing thus to the musical icon’s demise. In so 
doing, the panelists seek to maintain a contested set of standards in relation to Mitch 
Winehouse’s actions as a father, something which he resists (Dovey 2000). The 
selected episode has thus provided us with an apposite context in which to explore the
relationship between public denunciation, blaming, and (alleged) infringements of the 
moral order. Jane paints a picture of Amy as a victim of her father’s actions, that is, as 
bereft of agency. She emphasizes the dependency of the deceased to her father, 
thereby lowering the offender’s moral standing with respect to the basic norms that a 
parent-child relationship should entail. This helps her to depict Mitch as responsible 
for his daughter’s self-destruction, thereby legitimizing their public denunciation of 
him.
We have also seen that blaming constitutes a negative judgment of wrongful 
conduct where the perpetrator is made responsible for performing actions that 
contravene presumed behavioural norms. It carries damaging face implications and is 
a potential vehicle for causing offence or for establishing that an offence has taken 
place. It is thus in the interests of the alleged perpetrator to rebut or deflect the 
grounds on which his blameworthiness is based. This is because the negative 
evaluations rest on the infringement of social expectations and, it is only when 
agency, responsibility for particular happenings including those in which others 
involved may have rather limited capacity to influence (Laidlaw 2010:163), can be 
attributed to the perpetrator that blaming can be successfully performed or an offence 
claimed to have taken place, especially by those not directly involved.
Blame consists of holding someone accountable for behaviour that 
transgresses perceived moral expectations (Buttny 1993). The case of blaming 
examined in this paper was evidently an affront on Mitch, in particular to his moral 
standing as a father. Mitch reacted by defending himself, thus signaling his 
interpretation of the exchange as offensive insofar as it is close to a public shaming 
(Bramall 2018). The analysis has also shown that the moralizing judgments on which 
the accusations were based depend largely on concerns about blame rather than 
ability, that is, on issues of agency. So, concerns about blame play an important role 
on how we understand social obligations and offensive behaviour.
However, we have also suggested that the attempts by the panelists to assign 
blame to Mitch Winehouse for his role in enabling his daughter’s downfall amount to 
more than simply threats to his face or moral standing. As Garfinkel (1956) noted in 
his initial characterization of public denunciations, “the work of denunciation effects 
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the recasting of the objective character of the perceived other: the other person 
becomes in the eyes of his condemners literally a different and new person. It is not 
that the new attributes are added to the old ‘nucleus.’ He is not changed, he is 
reconstituted” (Garfinkel 1956: 421, original emphasis). In this case, the public 
denunciation of Mitch Winehouse in which the panelists engage amounts to a ritual 
destruction of his moral self. 
Prior work from a social psychological perspective has suggested that moral 
criticisms, such as those accomplished through blaming and public denunciation, are 
primarily a means of social control or regulation (Malle, Gugliemo and Monore 
2014). However, it is not clear what the panelists on Loose Women would gain from 
attempting to control or regulate Mitch Winehouse’s behaviour. Günthner (1995) 
suggests that by reproaching a third party for violating some kind of moral norm, one 
demonstrates “identification with the violated norm and hence, implicitly treat the 
moral norm as valid” (p.171). In other words, “in finding fault with another’s conduct,
a speaker in effect formulates some normative standard(s) that the other’s behaviour 
has transgressed” (Drew 1998: 303). Thus, by engaging in a public denunciation of 
Mitch Winehouse, the panelists are thereby reaffirming the moral infrastructure of 
public life, as well morally positioning themselves with respect to the common moral 
ground (Günthner 1995).
A broader question remains, however, as to why public denunciations occur so 
frequently in public life; that is, “why [do] members of a community react with 
rejection and strong indignation when they hear about morally deviant actions which 
do not directly affect themselves” (Günthner 1995: 170). This question lies at the 
heart of the moral turn in public life we are arguably witnessing, as constraints on 
publicly denouncing immoral behavior appear to be on the wane. Earlier work in 
ethnomethodology by Douglas (1970) may provide some insights into this question. 
He suggests that every individual is necessarily “concerned in all situations with his 
[sic] moral worth relative to the moral worth of other individuals”, and so is 
“necessarily committed to a competitive struggle to morally upgrade himself and 
morally downgrade others (not identified with himself)” (Douglas 1970: 6). Notably, 
“each individual gains in moral worth to the extent that others lose in moral worth, 
and vice versa. (To this extent, at least, moral evaluations constitute a ‘zero-sum 
game’.)” (Douglas 1970: 6). The stakes in this game, as we have seen in recent years, 
can be very high indeed. Recent work by psychologists would suggest, however, that 
the potential social risk of engaging in moral criticisms of others is countered by the 
benefits for moral standing that accrue to self (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom and Rand 
2016).
A deep abiding concern for one’s moral worth is clearly nothing new, as the 
ongoing discursive struggle over the moral value of self (and others identified with 
self) over other is immanent to the moral infrastructure of public life. What appears to
be changing, then, is not the phenomena of degrading the moral self of others in order 
upgrade one’s own moral self as such, but rather the extent to which members of the 
Anglo-societies we have examined, such as Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the 
U.S., are entitled to publicly judge others. While moral criticisms, such as accusing, 
blaming, denouncing, reproaching, and so on, are evidently oriented as sensitive 
actions in the public sphere, it appears the previous moral imperatives for avoiding 
public denunciations are undergoing significant change. It remains an open question 
the extent to which this evident moral turn is part of a broader global trend. We 
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